Monday, July 21, 2014

HIGHLIGHTS OF BANKING CASES JOURNAL JULY 2014

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW —In matters ofpolicy decisions of Government in respect of economic matters, Courts cannot interfere unless such policy is contrary to Constitution.
Holy star Natural Resources Pvt. Ltd, v. Union of India     (Delhi HQ (DB) 233
ALTERNATIVE REMEDY — Enforcement of Security Interest — Secured creditor can proceed against any of the securities and borrower can have no objection — Remedy under Section 17 of Act is an efficacious remedy and High Court should not ordinarily interfere
under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution      [See SARFAES1 Act, 2002—Sections 17,
13(2), (4)]
Santosh Sheetgrah Pvt. Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank & Ors. (Allahabad HQ (DB) 160
APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL — In face of admission of accused that he had issued cheque not as a gift to complainant, but towards purchase of land, accused was obliged to see that cheque was honoured — Faced with prospect ofbeing convicted and there being no defence open, accused may take defence of this type and allege that cheque was issued for something else — If such defences were to be accepted, it would be impossible to achieve object for which Section 13S was brought on statute — Findings of Magistrate thoroughly improbable and unsustainable.
Vithal Tulshidas Zalmi v, Baswaraj Kedarji & Anr,   (Bombay HQ 170

ARBITRATION LAW — Commencement of arbitration proceedings — Bank guarantee
  Suit for return of margin money along with interest and cost—Dispute between plaintiff and'MGC' (member 'DSE')—'DSE' failed to andactively opposed any attempt to arbitrate dispute between plaintiff' MGC' —It cannot rely on furnishing of Bank guarantee to secure possible arbitral award to delay its obligation to pay plaintiff sum of Rs. 78 lacs — Counter proforma of Bank guarantee was in tune with parties' obligation under compromise order— There was no reason for 'DSE' to reject that proforma— Observations made by Court do not touch upon validity of'MGC's' claim against plaintiff for an amount of Rs. 3,49,530/
               plus interest -— This has not yet been settled by an arbitral Tribunal as mandated and may be gone into in future m accordance wtih\aw —Tailure to initiate any steps after Order and insistence by 'DSE' that arbitration had been conducted and initiated, relying on previous award which was set aside by AD J, also betrays attempt to block applicant's legitimate rights
   Inaction to commence arbitration proceedings immediately after compromise order of 28.5.2007 means cause of action to do so has become time-barred in view of Section 37 of Arbitration Act, 1940, as well as Section 43 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, read
with Section 3 of Limitation Act      /See Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 —Sectloit
43]
Delhi Stock Exchange Asson. Ltd. v. Hari Om Maheshwari (Delhi HC) (DB) 172

AUCTION SALE — Conducted by Authorised Officer being pre^ttwiditated and itl fraudulent manner colluding with BMW Industries and respondent No. 6 — Sale vitiated and liable to be quashed — No documentary evidence to show that Authorised Officer had fixed reserve price of property to be sold before sale was conducted — Appellants were unaware of mode of sale to be adopted by Authorised Officer and date of sale — Respondent No. 1 after selling the secured assets left residual in the custody of BMW industries No evidence on record to show that Authorised Officer pubtished any notice informing public at large to sell secured assets by way of private treaty — Secured assets would not have fetched the best possible price [See SARFAESI Act, 2002^Sections 13(2), 13(4), 18]
Coventry Spring & Engineering Co. Ltd. v. ARC I Ltd, (DRAT—Mumbai) (DRAT) 40
Setting aside — Mortgaged Properties — Compromise — Redemption of mortgage — Borrower/mortgagor directed to pay Rs. 5.5 lacs as compensation interest to appellant/ auction purchaser — Besides deposit of said amount of Rs. 5,5 lacs, borrower/mortgagor deposited Rs. 5.5 lacs through pay order with Registrar of DRT-III, Delhi — Since amount of Rs. 5.5 lacs deposited by borrower/mortgagor with State Bank of Patiala for payment to auction purchaser has not been paid to him and lying in deposit with it — Tribunal rightly directed for refund of said amount to borrower—This does not warrant any interference in review — No mistake apparent on face of record is seen in order.
Hem Chand Aggarwal v. Oriental Bank of Commerce (DRA T — Delhi) (DRA T) 37
BENAMI TRANSACTIONS — Prohibition of Benami transaction — Suit property claimed by defendants to have been transferred to plaintiff for consideration paid by defendant No. 3 Suit transaction would be Benami transaction which is prohibited under Section 3(1) of Act—Right to recover property by defendant No. 3 held Benami by plaintiff is prohibited by Section 4 of Act •— In view of prohibition of Benami transaction plaintiffs as owners must be taken to be owners — Court would not be enjoined to consider claim of defendant No. 3 as party who is stated to have provided consideration, actually paid by
BENAMI TRANSACTIONS — Prohibition of Benami transaction (Contd.)
plaintiffs to original land owners [See Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988—
Sections 4(1), 3(1)]
Hanif Gulamali Somji v. Purnima Agro Projects Pvt. Ltd.    (Bombay HC) 103
CHEATING—Criminal Breach of Trust—Dishonour of Cheque—No document proved to show that any money was entrusted to accused persons — There is heavy transaction of money — Appellate Court rightly found that in absence of any documentary evidence in this
regard only oral evidence could not be relieved upon   .[See Indian Penal Code, I860 —
Sections 406, 420]
Raju Mahato v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.         (Jharkhand HC) 158
—Dishonour of Cheque—'Account closed' at the instance of Commercial Tax Department in the year 2005—Cheque issued on 10.6.2007—Complaint for offence under Section 13 8, N.I. Act cannot be maintained — Accused acquitted for offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act.
Chandran M. v. Raj anna Gowda                          (Karnataka HC) 118
COMPANY LAW—Company in liquidation—Release and relinquishment of leasehold rights — Properties mortgaged with Bank - secured creditor — Disposal of — Lease hold rights in respect of plots Settlement of Bank with owners of plot Permission sought to release mortgaged rights in favour of owners on receipt of Rs. 1.40 crores DRT already granted permission Order of Company Court consequential to such permission — Such order necessary as otherwise Official Liquidator or Bank would not be able to fetch any
income from mortgaged property —• No objection raised by Official Liquidator   [See
SARFAESIAci, 2602—Sections 13(2), 13(4)]
Nagindas Kgsiitrchand v. Official Liquidator, High Court of Bom. (Bombay HC) 34
COMPROMISE ORDER — Commencement of arbitration proceedingsBank guarantee Suit for return of margin money along with interest and costDispute between plaintiff and 'MGC' (member 'DSE')'DSE' failed to and actively opposed any attemptto arbitrate dispute between plaintiff'MGC' — It cannot rely on furnishing of Bank guarantee to secure possible arbitral award to delay its obligation to pay plaintiff sum of Rs. 78 lacs — Counter proforma of Bank guarantee was in tune with parties' obligation under compromise order— There was no reason for 'DSE' to reject that proforma -— Observations made by Court do not touch upon validity of'MGC's' claim against plaintiff for an amount of Rs. 3,49,530!
-  plus interest—This has not yet been settled by an arbitral Tribunal as mandated and may be gone into in future in accordance with law — Failure to initiate any steps after order and insistence by 'DSE' that arbitration had been conducted and initiated, relying on previous award which was- set aside by ADJ, also betrays attempt to block applicant's legitimate rights  [See Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order 23 Rule 3]
Delhi Stock Exchange Asson. Ltd. v. Hari Om Maheshwari (Delhi HC) (DB) 172
    Parties cannot revenge from their compromises, transformed through an order of the Court under Order 23 Rule 3, CPC,
Delhi Stock Exchange Asson. Ltd. v. Hari Om Maheshwari (Delhi HC) (DB) 172
Text Box: INDEXText Box: (v)
Text Box: Vol. HI

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Constitutional Limit of Delegated Legislation—Delegation CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Constitutional Limit of Delegated Legislation (ContiL)
is valid only when legislative policy and guidelines to implement it are adequately laid down and delegate is only empowered to carry out policy within guidelines laid down by Legislature — Legislature cannot delegate essential legislative functions, which consist in determination of or choosing of legislative policy and formally enacting that policy into binding rule of conduct.
Holystar Natural Resources Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India     (Delhi HC) (DB) 233
  Constitutionality of Enactment—Presumption is always in favour of constitutionality of enactment — Burden heavily lies on person who assails constitutionality of provision.
Holystar Natural Resources Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India      (Delhi HC) (DB) 233
    Non-Performing Assets (NPA) — Constitutionality of enactment — Provisions of Section 2(l)(o) of SARFAESI Act and RBI circular dated 1.7.2013 not violative of Arts. 14 and 19(l)(g) of Constitution of India — Petitioner could not place any convincing material to show Section 2(l)(o) of Act and RBI circular dated 1.7.2013 are unreasonable, arbitrary or otherwise repugnant to constitutional principle,
Holystar Natural Resources Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India      (Delhi HC) (DB) 233
—Repugnancy—Gujarat Stamp Act, 1958—Circular dated30.4.2011 issued by respondent No. 3 is held ultra vires provisions of Gujarat Stamp Act and Article 265 of Constitution of India.
Canara Bank v. Collector of Stamps cfe Ors.    (Gujarat HC) (DB) 89
CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST—Cheating—- Dishonour of Cheque—No document proved to show that any money was entrusted to accused persons — There is heavy transaction of money —Appellate Court rightly found that in absence of any documentary
evidence in this regard only oral evidence could not be relieved upon         [See Indian Penal
Code, 1860 — Sections 406, 420]
Rajn Mahato v. State of Jharkhand A Ors.         (Jharkhand HC) 158
CRIMINAL TRIAL—Cardinal Rule—Parties at the trial receiving equal fair opportunity, to place respective case before Court by adducing evidence relating to matters in question, as made permissible under provisions of procedural law.
Tikaram v. Shruti Swapnil Choudhary & Anr.         (Bombay HC) 257
CROSS-EXAMINATION — Refusal to grant permission — Denial of opportunity to petitioners in putting forth their case before Tribunal to be looked into by DRAT — Permission granted to petitioners to file additional affidavit by way of further evidence of petitioners to proceed in matter in accordance with law.
Shh'aganga Leather Crafts & Ors. v. Canara Bank (Karnataka HC) 70
DISHONOUR OF CHEQUE — Appeal against acquittal — In face of admission of accused that he had issued cheque not as a gift to complainant, but towards purchase of land, accused was obliged to see that cheque was honoured — Faced with prospect of being convicted and there being no defence open, accused may take defence of this type and allege
that cheque was issued for something else       [See Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 —
Section 138}
Vithal Tulshidas Zalmi v. Baswaraj Kedarji & Anr.   (Bombay HC) / 70
(342)

Cheating — 'Account closed' at the instance of Commercial Tax Department in the year 2005 — Cheque issued on 10.6.2007 — Complaint for offence under Section 138, N.I, Act cannot be maintained — Accused acquitted for offence under Section 138 of N.I, Act — Appellant to take appropriate steps to approach Court for offence under Section 420, IPC.
Chandran M. v, Rajanna Gowda               ,            (Karnataka HC) 118
   Cheques issued for consideration — Respondent - accused failed to discharge statutory onus placed on him to prove that cheques in question were without consideration — Evidence produced by complainant - appellant clearly proves that sum ofRs. 6,71,326/- was due to complainant—Impugned orders set aside—Respondent - accused is convicted under Section 138 of N.I. Act and sentenced to undergo R.I. for 3 months each in both complaints.
Vijay Power Generators Ltd. v, Annai Engineering Works & Anr. (Delhi HC) 216
    Criminal Breach of Trust — Cheating — No document proved to show that any money was entrusted to accused persons—There is heavy transaction of money—Appellate Court rightly found that in absence of any documentary evidence in this regard only oral evidence could not be relieved upon — No reason for convicting accused persons for offence under Section 420, IPC on same very allegation—No cheque was seized by Investigating Officer nor produced by prosecution — Dishonour of alleged cheque not proved by prosecution — Ingredients for offenpe under Section 138 of N.I. Act could not be proved.
Raju Mahato v. State ofJhariMartd & Ors.          (Jharkhand HC) 158
   Ingredients of offence.
Chabi Bhoralee v. State of Assam & Anr,                (Gauhati HC) 121
Ingredients required to be fulfilled •— Discussed.
Sri Ajay Sharda v. State of U. P. & Anr.              (Allahabad HC) 149
     Issue of Process — Challenge against — Prosecution initiated in spite of payment of demand notice within time — Entirejjn.0unt of cheque paid to payee — Complaint filed to recover Gertain other amounts from applicant which are said to be due and payable by her "to respondent No. 2 — Even if such amounts are due, applicant cannot be prosecuted for Offence under Section 138 of N.l. Act as amount of cheque already paid and conditions requisite for initiating prosecution under Section 138 not fulfilled — Fit case to quash prosecution in exercise of inherent powers.        *
Sunita Gajanan G ulawe v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.   (Bombay HC) HI
   Joint Trial — Multiple cheques — Single complaint — Maintainability — Ten cheques simultaneously presented to banker on the same day and dishonoured on the same very day —Consolidated notice for all cheques issued calling upon drawer to make good the payment of these cheques, does not suffer from the vice of joinder of many offences in one trial — It cannot be said that ten offences have been committed by the accused and therefore, Section 219, Cr.P.C. does not come into piay,
Charashm Kumar Talwani v. Malhotra Poultries    (P&H HC) (DB) 135
  Multiple cheques — Single complaint — Maintainability — In the case of dishonour of multiple cheques presented together forwhieh a consolidated single notice issued, tantamounts (via)   BANKING CASES         July—2014
DISilONOlillOF CHEQUE—Multiple chequcs— Single complaint — Maintainability (Contd.)
to commission of a single offence under Section 138 after prescribed period of receipt of notice on non-payment of the amount of cheques — A single complaint is maintainable for all these dishonoured cheques.
Char ash ni Kumar Talwani v. Malhotra Poultries   (P&H HC) (DB) 135
  Notice — Second notice not sent on correct address—No street number or house number mentioned -— Registered cover received back by complai-nant — No postman examined to prove that respondent refused to receive this registered cover — Not an iota of evidence on record to show legal notice sent on correct address — No presumption that notice has been served upon respondent Impugned judgment correct as per law and upheld.
A jay a Industries v. Gulshan Rai Malhotra                 (P&H HC) 154
Offence by Company Complaint filed against Managing Director and Director of company without arraigned company as accused Cheque was issued by company for repayment of loan — Complaint not maintainable in view ofApex Court decision i nAnceta Hada 's case — Conviction set aside.
B.L. Boolani v. Vasanth Kumar Banger a                (Karnataka HC) 111
—Offence by Company—Issue of Process—Petitioner is Managing Director of Company and responsible to company for managing its day-to-day affairs — Requirements of provisions of Section 202, Cr.P.C. complied with by Court below in terms of order passed by this Court -— It is for petitioner to prove that he is not liable to be prosecuted on plea that offence was committed without his knowledge or he exercised all due diligence to prevent commission of alleged offence during trial and that Court be adjudged within scope of Section 202, Cr.P.C.
Paw an Kumar Agarwal v. State of West Bengal & Anr.      (Calcutta HC) 133
   Offence by Company — Liability of Director — Merely because one is a Director of company is not sufficient to make him liable under Section 141 ofN.I. Act—Director cannot be deemed to be in-charge of and responsible to company for conduct of its business — Specific averments to be made against accused - Director — Cognizance against petitioner quashed,
Chabi Bhoralee v. State of Assam & Anr,               (Gauhati HC) 121
   Offence by Company -— Liability of Directors -— Issue of process—- Accused Nos, 3 to 12 were Directors of accused No. 1 - Company — All the accused were in-charge of and responsible for conducting business of accused No. 1 in relation to subject matter of complaint and transaction under offence — There was no error in issue of process-— Applicants may be unable to show that complaint cannot proceed against them — Defences raised may be proved at the time of trial — No justification to discharge applicants.
Salil Dinkarrai Gandhi v. Osmanabad District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd.
(Bombay HC) 206
Offence by Company Territorial jurisdiction Petitioner was in-charge of and responsible for conduct of affairs of company — If five different acts done in five different localities, anyone of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become place of trial for offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act — Complainant will have (344)
DISHONOUR OF CHEQUE — Offence by Company — Territorial jurisdiction (Conld.)
right in any of the five local areas where cause of action has arisen — Courts having jurisdiction over anyone of the local areas within territorial limits of any of the five acts was done to try the case.
Sri Ajay Sharda v. State ofU.P.& Anr,                (Allahabad HC) 149
   Offence by Firm — Notice — Company can be 'drawer' of cheque as Well as juristic person committing offence under Section 138 Notice against firm can be deemed to be a notice against all its instrumentalitiesNo separate notice needto be issued individually under Section 138(b) against each partner.
Susan Zachariah v, Muthoot Capital Services Ltd.      (Kerala HC) 72
   Offence by Firm — Vicarious liability — All partners cannot be held liable for offences committed by firm—Only those partners who were in-charge of and responsible for conduct of business of firm at time of commission of offence alone can be held liable.
Susan Zachariah v. Muthoot Capital Services Ltd.      (Kerala HC) 72
   Offence by Firm — Vicarious liability — When offence under Section 138 is committed by a firm and it is proved that offence was committed with the 'consent' or 'connivance' of or is attributable to any 'neglect' on the part of any partner, manager or other officer of firm, he would be deemed guilty of that offence and liable to be proceeded against.
Susan Zachariah v. Muthoot Capital Services Ltd.      (Kerala HC) 72
   Offence by Firm — Vicarious liability — No averment that petitioners being partners were in-charge of and were responsible to firm for the conduct of business of firm, at the time when offence was committed—Petitioners will not fall under Section 141 (1)—Complaint against petitioners quashed.
Susan Zachariah v, Muthoot Capital Services Ltd.      (Kerala HC) 72
   Offence by Firm — Vicarious liability — When offence under Section 138 is alleged against partner who has not signed cheque and who allegedly consented and connived to issue the cheque, to make that partner vicariously liable for acts of firm, it is obligatory on part of complainant to make specific allegation of 'acts' or conduct, neglect and omission constituting offence — Averment must also contain specific allegation of his acts deeds as to how and in what manner that partner was responsible for conduct of business of firm.
Susan Zachariah v. Muthoot Capital Services Ltd.      (Kerala HC) 72
  Offence by Firm — Vicarious liability — When silent partners are specifically <r".eluded from the day-to-day responsibility, they are not liable to be proceeded against, in absence of positive averments indicating their involvement in commission of offence contravening exclusion clause of partnership deed averments in complaint against petitioners do not satisfy statutory requirements under Section 141 —Allegation confined in one sentence with words 'consent' and 'connivance' adopted from section alone does not constitute or disclose offence alleged against them in absence of other 'facts' constituting offence — Complaint against petitioners quashed.
Susan Zachariah v. Muthoot Capital Services Ltd.      (Kerala HC) 72
Text Box: INDEXGOVERNMENT CONTRACT — Construction of bus stand — Cancellation of lease  agreement — At no stage, appellant had any privity of contract with IDA — 'MPRTC' entered into s B0T contract with appellant contrary to terms and conditions of lease which provided specifically that land shall be used for constructing bus stand-cum-commercial complex — 'MPRTC' had no legal right to create any further right in favour of appellant with regard to receiving of premium on constructed units sold, to third parties — 'MPRTC' would not be in a position to continue with lease as it is heavily indebted presently — Even proposed site where bus stand-cum- commercial complex was to be constructed is under attachment — Claim made by appellant is in nature of damages for breach of contract and/ orrelief ofspecific performance of contract—Appellant willhaveno cause of action against IDA as there is no privity of contract between parties — Lease has come to an end by efflux of time —- Even otherwise, these are issues which would involve adjudication of disputed questions of fact which can only be suitably adjudicated in civil suit as directed by High Court in impugned judgment -— Appellant shall be at liberty to seek its remedies against 'MPRTC' for breach of contract.
Sri Ram Builders v. State of M.P. & Ors.  (Supreme Court of India) 186
GUARANTOR'S LIABILITY — Time barred debt — Acknowledgement of debt by principal borrower — Extension of limitation qua guarantor — Continuing guarantee — Acknowledgement of debt by principal borrower waives earlier demands made against guarantors because by acknowledgement executed there is no default of principal borrower
and existence of which is sine qua non for liability of guarantors to commence    .[See
Limitation/
Subhash Chand & Anr. v. State Bank of Patiala & Anr.      (Delhi HC) 266
INTEREST Rate of, to be chargeable by Bank — Determination — Default in payment ofEMIs—While contesting S.A., it was Bank's case to be entitled to future interest @ 7.25% p.a. — During proceeding of S.A. before Tribunal also, neither any claim qua compounding of interest made nor interest was claimed @ 27% p.a.—Claim of interest with compounding effect made for the first time before this Tribunal in this appeal is not acceptable — Rate of interest payable by appellants is fixed @ 10% p.a. on reducing balance basis — Appellants directed to pay interest w.e.f. 25.8.2006.
Vikas Vij&Anr. v. Standard Chartered Bank & Ors. (DRAT — Delhi) (DRAT) 7
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES Taxing statute —-_Qne and th^onlv proper test would be that the question is not at what transaction the sceriefrtSWuned, but whattransaction its language according to its natural meaning fairly and squarely hits.
Canara Bank v. Collector of Stamps & Ors.  . (Gujarat HC) (DB) 89
ISSUE OF PROCESS —Dishonour of Cheque — Offence by Company — Petitioner is Managing Director of Company and responsible to company for managing its day-to-day affairs—Requirements of provisions of Section 202, Cr.P.C. complied with by Court below
in terms of order passed by this Court       [See Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 —

Sections 138, 141]
Pawan Kumar Agarwal v. State of West Bengal & Anr.       (Calcutta HC) 133
JUDICIAL REVIEW — Contractual matters — Scope of judicial review is very limited
JUDICIAL REVIEW — Contractual matters — Scope of judicial review (Coittd.)
in contractual matters even where one of contracting parties is State or instrumentality of State — Appellant can seek appropriate relief by way of civil suit—High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India would not normally grant relief of specific performance of contract.
Sri Ram Builders v. State of M.P. & Ors.  (Supreme Court of India) 186
  In fiscal matters and/or where discretion is conferred on high ranking statutory authorities like RBI, Courts do not ordinarily interfere with in exercise of power of judicial review.
Holystar Natural Resources Pvt. Ltd. v. IJnion of India    (Delhi HC) (DB) 233
LEGAL MAXIM — "Actus curiae neminem gravabit" — Meaning of— "An act of the Court shall prejudice no one".
Delhi Stock Exchange Asson. Ltd. v. Hari Om Maheshwari (Delhi HC) (DB) 172
LIMITATION — Time barred debt — Acknowledgement of debt by principal borrower —Extension of limitation qua guarantor — Continuing guarantee — Acknowledgement of debt by principal borrower waives earlier demands made against guarantors because by acknowledgement executed there is no default of principal borrower and existence of which is sine qua non for liability of guarantors to commence — Once suit against principal borrower is held to be within limitation, suit against appellants/guarantors is also within limitation, inasmuch as suit is not filed as against appellants/guarantors after 3 years of making of demand after signing of acknowledgement of debt letter dated 21.7.1994.
Subhash Chand & Anr. v. State Bank of Patiala & Anr.       (Delhi HC) 266
QUASHING OF PROCEEDINGS — Dishonour of cheque — Power of Attorney — Complaint filed by power of attorney holder of proprietor of firm — He is in-charge of the business ofpayee-complainant firm and is personally aware ofthe transactions—Complaint is signed by him on behalf of the payee-complainant firm — He can be examined as the complainant — Complaint cannot be quashed.
'                                           JL         '
Rifakat Ali Choudhar}> v. State of Rajasthan & Anr.         (Rajasthan HC) 115
RECALL OF WITNESS—Dishonour of Cheque—Application for examination rejected en ground that application failed to disclose relevancy of evidence proposed to be adduced in case — Impugned order cannot be faulted — In interest of justice, opportunity granted to applicant to apply afresh incorporating reason for which he intends to adduce evidence of witness for which he is seeking summons.
Tikaram v. Shruti Swapnil Choudhary & Anr.          (Bombay nC) 257
RECOVERY OF DEBT AMOUNT -— Suit decreed with costs — Suit decided in favour of plaintiff to extent that plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 24,90,000/- along with interest
  Interest to be calculated from dates when amounts were debited from account of plaintiff i.e. 29.6.2007 to 31.7.2007 at rate on which Bank would have awarded interest to plaintiff —This has to be as per terms agreed upon between plaintiff and defendant - Bank at the time and in terms of execution of agreement entered for preparation of FDRs — Plaintiff is also entitled to recover sum of Rs. 1,100/- as costs of notice.

Sham Mahajan v. H.P. State Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Anr. (HP HC) 258
RDDBFI — Company in Liquidation — Only DRT has exclusive j urisdiction in respect of subject matter of such recovery proceedings —- Company Court cannot dispose of such immovable property of company in liquidation in favour of Bank and Financial Institutions and distribute sale proceeds thereof — This Court cannot sanction any sale in favour of such secured creditors in respect of properties of company in liquidation.
Nagindas Kasturchand v. Official Liquidator, High Court of Bom. (Bombay HC) 34
  Cross-examination — Denial of opportunity—Matter remitted for reconsideration after permitting cross-examination of AW 1.
Shivaganga Leather Crafts & Ors. v. Canara Bank  (Karnataka HC) 70
RBI'S DIRECTIONS AND GUIDELINES -— Have statutory flavour and Banks have to abide by them.
Holystar Natural Resources Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India      (Delhi HC) (DB) 233
SARFAESI — Assignment of debt — Fully governed by provisions of Section 5 of Act •— Section 13 is only for enforcement of security interest — DRT has nothing to do with issue of assignment of debt, while dealing with application of petitioner under Section 17( 1) of Act
  Petitioner unnecessa-rily prolonging the dispute on one pretext or other—Plea on which writ petition filed is completely misconceived •— Costs of Rs. 50,000/- imposed on petitioner.
Rita Machine (I) Ltd. v. DRAT & Ors.                   (P&H HC) (DB) 81
—Auction Sale — Conducted by Authorised Officer being pre-meditated and in fraudulent manner colluding with BMW Industries and respondent No. 6 — Sale vitiated and liable to be quashed—No documentary evidence to show that Authorised Officer had fixed reserve price of property to be sold before sale was conducted—Appellants were unaware of mode of sale to be adopted by Authorised Officer and date of sale—RespondentNo. 1 after selling the secured assets left residual in the custody of BMW Industries—No evidence on record to show that Authorised Officer published any notice informing public at large to sell secured assets by way of private treaty — Secured assets would not have fetched the best possible price       [See SARFAESI Act, 2002—Sections 13(2), 13(4), 18]
Coventry Spring c& Engineering Co.. v. ARCILtd. (DRAT — Mumbai) (DRAT) 40
—Auction Sale — Setting aside — Authorised Officer did not serve any advance notice of 30 days of proposed sale to borrower—Non-compliance of mandatory Rules 6(2) and 8(6) of Rules—Authorised Officer sold immovable suit property without any demarcation with proper mark of identification — Sale is vitiated — If impugned sale is conducted by Authorised Officer in violation of Rules, it cannot be protected in the name of equity .
Soma Papers and Industries Ltd. v. Bank of India (DRAT-—Mumbai) (DRAT) 12
   'Conveyance' — Stamp Duty Recovery of deficit amountOrder passed by District Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 14 of 2002 Act could not be termed as an4 instrument' as defined under Section 2(g), (i) of Gujarat Stamp Act—Noright or liability is created in favour of secured creditor so as to bring it within sweep of definition of'conveyance' as defined in Section 2(g) of 1958 Act — Similarly, Panchnama drawn at the time of taking over of physical possession of secured asset pursuant to order passed by District Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 14 of 2002 Act, would
SARFAESI — 'Conveyance' — Stamp Duty — Recovery of deficit amount (Contd.)
also not create any special right in favour of secured creditor so as to bring such Panchnama within the sweep of definition of term 'instrument' under Section 2(i) of 1958 Act       [See
SARFAESI Act, 2002— Sections 13(4), 14]
Canara Bank v. Collector of Stamps & Ors.        (Gujarat HC) (DB) 89
  Declaration of account as non-performing asset — Default in repayment of loan amount
   Dispute is between appellant Bank and respondentState Financial Corporation is not included within definition of'financial institution' given in Section 2(1 )(m) of SARFAESI Act — "Nothing on record to show that respondent is financial institution — Provision of Section 11 of SARFAESI Act not attracted.
State Bank ofPatialav. Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd.                                                               (DRA T — Delhi) (DRA T) 9
   Non-Performing Assets (NPA) — Classification of account — Legislature has clearly defined NPA under Section 2(1 )(o) of SARFAESI Act — RBI guidelines are issued to improve quality of assets of Bank and recover public money speedily — No excessive delegation or scope for Banks to act upon basing on their whims and fancies [See SARFAESI Act, 2002— Section 2(1) (o)]
Holystar Natural Resources Pvt. Ltd, v. Union of India     (Delhi HC) (DB) 233
    Non-Performing Assets (NPA) — Constitutionality of enactment — Provisions of Section 2(I)(o) of SARFAESI Act and RBI circular dated 1.7.2013 not violative of Arts. 14 and 19(l)(g) of Constitution of India — Petitioner could not place any convincing material to show Section 2(1 )(o) of Act and RBI circular dated 1.7.2013 are unreasonable, arbitrary or otherwise repugnant to constitutional principle,
Holystar Natural Resources Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India      (Delhi HC) (DB) 233
   Non-Performing Assets (NPA) — Declaration of account — Section 2(l)(o) is neither unreasonable nor violative of Arts. 14 and 19(l)(g) of Constitution — Section 2(1 )(o) of SARFAESI Act clearly defines NPA as an asset or an account classified as sub-standard, doubtful or loss asset-—Indian Parliament while enacting SARFAESI Act has not delegated essential legislative function to RBI/Financial Institution with regard to concept of NPA — Impugned circular dated 1.7.2013 issued by RBI which provides guidelines for determining
NPAs, is in conformity with Section 2(l) (o) of SARFAESI Act        [See SARFAESI Act, 2002— Sections 2(1) (o), 13(4)]
Holystar Natural Resources Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India      (Delhi HC) (DB) 233
    One Time Settlement — Rejection of request — Declaration of account as Non- Performing Asset—Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Scheme—Entitlement of petitioner to take benefit—Reserve Bank of India guidelines applicable to petitioner — Impugned demand does not refer to reasons based on which decision has been arrived at by respondent-Bank to come to conclusion that petitioner does not fall under category of MSME — Same liable to be quashed — Directions issued to respondent Bank to reconsider case of petitioner taking into consideration materials on record.
Hotel Paraag Ltd. v. State Bank of India             (Karnataka HC) 220
   Possession Notice—Invocation of writ jurisdiction to remove locks and setting aside of  possession notice—Possession of mortgaged property taken by Bank—Dispute regarding identification of property — Conclusive decision on identification and title of property may require evidence — Respondent No. 1 directed to hand over possession of property sealed within 15 days to petitioner subject to adjudication of title of property from competent DRT
   DRT shall examine evidence to be led and/or documents produced by parties to identify property mortgaged in favour of respondent No. 1 - Bank.
Daljit Kattr v. State Bank of India & Ors.           (P&H HC) (DB) 2 71
—Recovery ofhousing loan amount—Petitioner ready to liquidate remaining dues of Bank
  Bank is advised to fix up easy instalments for petitioner to liquidate its dues — Bank shall not take any coercive action till the defaults in payment of instalments,
Ramkrit Ram v. State Bank of India                         (Patna HC) 129
   Secured Assets — Authorised Officer while selling secured assets has to sell the same in transparent and fair manner which can fetch the best possible price — Borrower should be acquainted with mode of sale, date of sale and reserve price of property.
Coventry Spring de Engineering Co. v. ARC!Ltd. (DRAT— Mumbai) (DRAT) 40
    Security Interest — Enforcement of — Alternative efficacious remedy — Secured creditor can proceed against any of the securities and borrower can have no objection — Remedy under Section 17 of Act is an efficacious remedy and High Court should not ordinarily interfere under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution — Petitioner has an alternative remedy to adjudicate his grievance against proceedings initiated by respondent- Bank under Section 13(4) by approaching DRT under Section 17 — No good reasons to interfere in matter.
Santosh Sheetgrah Pvt. Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank & Ors. (Allahabad HC) (DB) !60
   Security Interest—Enforcement of— Declaration of company as sick— Suspension of legal proceedings— Non-entitlement— Reference under Section 15 of 1985 Act remains pending— Secured creditors fully empowered to take measures under Section 13(4) of2002 Act in accordance with third proviso to Section 15 of 1985 Act-- Reference cannot be said to be not pending after its registration under Section 15 of 1985Act or after declaration of company as sick unit   /See SARFAESI Act, 2002— Sections 13(2), 13(4)}
Uniword Telecom Ltd. & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors.         (AllahabadHC) (DB) 1
  Security Interest—Enforcement of — Notice—Writ jurisdiction — Secured assets not agricultural land but industrial land where factory of second petitioner existed — First ground raised by petitioners that respondent No. 1 - Bank is not a 'Public Financial Institution' or ' Bank' as defined under Sections 2(m) and 2(c) of Act is neither bona fide nor justified — Process of this Court is invoked only for securing an ex parte interim relief to stall confirmation of sale, which has already taken place — Writ petition is misconceived.
Bommidala Purnaiah Tobacco Pvt. Ltd. v. Export Import Bank of India ' (AP HC) (DB) 62
   Security Interest — Enforcement of — Refund of Amount — Default in repayment of loan amount — Declaration of account as NPA — Appellants are neither borrowers nor
SARFAESI — Security Interest — Enforcement of — Refund of Amount (Contd.)
guarantors or mortgagors of any property qua loan with any of the Banks — Appellants are bona fide purchasers of property in question for value without notice — Alleged equitable mortgage of that property with both Banks is invalid being vitiated by fraud and Court be enforced under provisions of SARFAESI Act—Tribunal below seriously erred in disposing of S.As. filed by appellants by directingthem to make deposits with Bank—Measures taken by both respon dent - Banks for enforcement of its security interest qua-property in question on basis of its alleged mortgage with them were not in accordance with provision of SARFAESI Act and were bad in law — Impugned orders set aside—Appellants entitled for refund of Rs. 10 lacs deposited by them pursuant to Tribunal's order with interest.
Anita & Anr. v. State Dank of India            (DRA T — Delhi) (DRA T) 1
— Statement of Objects and Reasons — Main purpose of Act is to enable and empower secured creditors to take possession of their securities and to deal with them without intervention of Court — It aims at expeditious recovery of NPAs of Banks and financial institutions.
Holystar Natural Resources Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India     (Delhi HC) (DB) 233
STAMP DUTY—'Conveyance'—Recovery of deficit amount—Order passed by District Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 14 of 2002 Act couid not be termed as an 'instrument' as defined under Section 2(g), (i) of Gujarat Stamp Act — No right or liability is created in favour of secured creditor so as to bring it within sweep of definition of 'conveyance' as defined in Section 2(g) of 1958 Act — Similarly, Panchnama drawn at the time of taking over of physical possession of secured asset pursuant to order passed by District Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 14 of 2002 Act, would also not create any special right in favour of secured creditor so as to bring such Panchnama within the sweep ofdefinition ofterm 'instrument' under Section 2(i) of i 958 Act—Circular dated 30.4.2011 issued by respondent No. 3 is held ^{tmmres provisions of Gujarat Stamp
Act and Article 265 of Constitution of India   [See SARFAESI Act, 2002— Sections
13(4), 141
Canara Bank v. Collector of Stamps & Ors.        (Gujarat HC) (DB) 89
STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS — Possession of mortgaged properties — Restoration of possession — Petitioner is not borrower but auction purchaser—Impugned
action of respondents under Section 29 of Act is quashed   [See State Financial
Corporations Act, 1951 — Section 29]
Ramesh Chander v. Punjab Financial Corporation & Anr. (P&H HC) (DB) 263
TAXATION — Principles—Taxing or fiscal statute demands strict construction — Rule 1 of construction of a charging section is that before taxing a person it must be shown that he falls within the ambit thereof by clear words used as no one can be taxed by implication.
Canara Bank v. Collector of Stamps <4 Ors.       (Gujarat HC) (DB) 89
TENDER — Bid — Rejection — Lack of sufficient experience — Supply of security holograms to Excise Department — Five years' experience in use of origination systems — Eligibility criteria not fulfilled — Petitioner chose to bid for tender even when it was fully aware that it was not eligible — Vague allegations of mala fide cannot be held against respondents — Petitioner not entitled to any relief.
Uflex Ltd. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.                    (Sikkim HC) 224
•— Doctrine of waiver and acquiescence — After having participated in tender process, it is not permissible for party to raise objections.
Uflex Ltd. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.       ""             (Sikkim HC) 224
Notice Inviting Tender—Extension of time for submitting and opening of technical bids
   Production of requisite documents as per requirements authorities not possible on short notice — Time extended for 10 days for submitting and opening of Technical Bids.
G.L. Agarwalla v. State of Meghalaya & Ors.       (Meghalaya HC) 120
TEST OF REASONABLENESS Application of Criteria is whether law strikes a proper balance between social contract on one hand and rights of individual on the other hand.
Holystar Natural Resources Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India      (Delhi HC) (DB) 233
WORDS AND PHRASES —'Person' — Meaning ofWord 'person* includes any company or association or body of person whether incorporated.
Susan Zachariah v. Muthoot Capital Services Ltd.      (Kerala HC) 72
   'Security Interest', 'Collateral Security' -— Meaning of.
Santosh Sheetgrah Pvt. Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank & Ors. (Allahabad HC) (DB) 160
WRIT JURISDICTION — Correctness or otherwise of the order need not be gone into at this stage.
Shivaganga Leather Crafts & Ors. v. Canara Bank  (Karnataka HC) 70
—Enforcement of Security Interest — Notice — Secured assets not agricultural land but industrial land where factory of second petitioner existed — First ground raised by petitioners that respondent No. 1 - Bank is not a 'Public Financial Institution' or 'Bank' as defined under Sections 2(m) and 2(c) of Act is neither bonafide nor justified — Process of this Court is invoked only for securing an ex parte interim relief to stall confirmation of sale, which has already taken place — Writ petition is misconceived.
Bommidala Purnaiah Tobacco Pvt. Ltd. v. Export Import Bank of India
(AP HC) (DB) 62
   Quashing and setting aside of order passed by DRT — Violation of principles of natural justice — No effective hearing given to petitioner before delivering judgment — Matter remitted to DRT to decide afresh after taking into consideration submissions of both parties.
Pradeep Kumar v. Debt Recovery Tribunal & Ors. (Jharkhand HC) 143
   Scope of powers and restrictions in exercise of such power — Availability of alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to entertain writ petition.

Canara Bank v. Collector of Stamps & Ors.        (Gujarat HC) (DB) 89 

United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 110: 2010 (9) SCR 1

SECURITISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTEREST ACT, 2002:

s.13(8) - Right of borrower - Held: The provision contained in s.13(8) is specifically for the protection of the borrowers in as much as, ownership of the secured assets is a constitutional right vested in the borrowers and protected u/Article 300A of the Constitution - Therefore, the secured creditor as a trustee of the secured asset cannot deal with the same in any manner it likes and such an asset can be disposed of only in the manner prescribed in the SARFAESI Act - Therefore, the creditor should ensure that the borrower was clearly put on notice of the date and time by which either the sale or transfer will be effected in order to provide the required opportunity to the borrower to take all possible steps for retrieving his property - Such a notice is also necessary to ensure that the process of sale will ensure that the secured assets will be sold to provide maximum benefit to the borrowers - The notice is also necessary to provide the required opportunity to the borrower to take all possible steps for retrieving his property or at least ensure that in the process of sale the secured asset derives the maximum benefit and the secured creditor or anyone on its behalf is not allowed to exploit the situation of the borrower by virtue of the proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 300A.

s.13 - Sale of Non performing asset - Sale consideration only Rs.10,000 above the reserve price whereas property worth much more - Held: The secured creditors are expected to take bonafide measures to ensure that there is maximum yield from such secured assets for the borrowers - Sale null and void being in violation of provisions of s.13 and rr.8 and 9 and liable to be set aside - Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 - rr.8 and 9.

s.13 - Sale of Non performing asset - Single judge of the High Court after holding that the sale was invalid as there was violation of rules, directed making of payments by borrowers to the Bank with clear direction that on such payment, insofar as the bank is concerned its dues would be settled - Not only borrowers made the payment as directed which was accepted by bank, the Bank even accepted the said judgment and did not file any appeal there against - Only the buyer filed the appeal - In the facts of the case, once the payment is made to the buyer by borrowers the possession of the property shall be delivered to the borrowers with no further liability towards the bank.

SECURITY INTEREST (ENFORCEMENT) RULES, 2002:

rr.8 and 9 - Held: Any sale effected without complying with the rules would be unconstitutional and null and void.

r.8(8) - Sale by any method other than public auction or public tender shall be on such terms as may be settled between the parties in writing - In the instant case, no terms were settled between the parties that the
sale can be effected by Private Treaty - The Borrowers were not even called to the joint meeting between the Bank and the Sale Agent - There was violation of rules rendering the sale void.

Respondent no.1 and 2 had taken various loans from respondent no.3-Bank. Upon failure of respondent no.1 and 2 to repay the loan, their assets mortgaged with respondent no.3-Bank were classified as Non-Performing Assets. Respondent no.3-Bank issued a demand notice and then a possession notice under the SARFAESI Act. Respondent no.1 and 2 challenged the two notices before the High Court. Meanwhile, auction sale was fixed but no sale took place as there were no bidders. Respondent no.1 and 2 sought cancellation of auction notice and sought permission of respondent no3-Bank to sell the secured assets by private treaty.   The outstanding balance to the bank was Rs.1.57 crores.

Respondent Nos.1 and 2 made a payment of Rs.42 lacs to respondent no.3-Bank, by selling machinery with the permission of respondent no.3-Bank. A request was also made for an extension of two months for paying the remaining amount after selling the secured assets. Respondent no.3-Bank gave approval for private sale of the immovable property and the secured assets were sold in favour of the appellant for a consideration of 123.10 lacs. The sale was affected through Ge-Winn Management Company, Resolution Agents.

The reserve price of the secured assets was fixed at 123 lacs. Sale deed was executed in favour of the appellants by respondent No.3 on 20th December, 2006, as the entire consideration was paid on 15th December, 2006. On 21st December, 2006, respondent Nos.1 and 2 were informed by respondent No.3-Bank that the secured assets had been sold for more than the amount offered by them. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 filed writ petition without disclosing that the earlier writ petition challenging the auction notice had been withdrawn without the court giving liberty to respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to file a fresh writ petition.

The single judge of the High Court allowed the writ petitions. The sale in favour of the appellant was held to be vitiated on the ground that respondent No.3-Bank failed to follow the mandatory provisions of Rules 8(5), 8(6) and 9(2) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. But a direction was issued to refund the amount paid by the petitioner i.e. Rs.1crore 41 lacs with interest at 9% per annum from April, 2007. The
Division Bench of the High Court upheld the order of the single judge. The instant appeals were filed challenging the order of the High Court.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD:  1. The findings recorded by the High Court that there has been a
violation of Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 were perfectly
justified. The provision contained in Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act,
2002 is specifically for the protection of the borrowers in as much as,
ownership of the secured assets is a constitutional right vested in the
borrowers and protected under Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
Therefore, the secured creditor as a trustee of the secured asset can not
deal with the same in any manner it likes and such an asset can be disposed
of only in the manner prescribed in the SARFAESI Act, 2002.  Therefore, the
creditor should ensure that the borrower was clearly put on notice of the
date and time by which either the sale or transfer will be effected in
order to provide the required opportunity to the borrower to take all
possible steps for retrieving his property.  Such a notice is also
necessary to ensure that the process of sale will ensure that the secured
assets will be sold to provide maximum benefit to the borrowers.  The
notice is also necessary to ensure that the secured creditor or any one on
its behalf is not allowed to exploit the situation by virtue of proceedings
initiated under the SARFAESI Act, 2002.  In view of Rules 8 and 9(1), any
sale effected without complying with the same would be unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void.  In the present case, there is an additional
reason for declaring that sale in favour of the appellant was a nullity.
Rule 8(8) states that sale by any method other than public auction or
public tender, shall be on such terms as may be settled between the parties
in writing.    There were no terms settled in writing between the parties
that the sale can be affected by Private Treaty.  In fact, the borrowers -
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were not even called to the joint meeting between
the Bank - Respondent No.3 and Ge-Winn held on 8th December, 2006.

Therefore, there was a clear violation of the aforesaid Rules rendering the
sale illegal. Generally proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 against
the borrowers are initiated only when the borrower is in dire-straits.  The
provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the Rules, 2002 have been enacted
to ensure that the secured asset is not sold for a song.  It is expected
that all the banks and financial institutions which resort to the extreme
measures under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 for sale of the secured assets to
ensure, that such sale of the asset provides maximum benefit to the
borrower by the sale of such asset. Therefore, the secured creditors are
expected to take bonafide measures to ensure that there is maximum yield
from such secured assets for the borrowers.  In the present case, sale
consideration is only Rs.10,000/- over the reserve price whereas the
property was worth much more.  The sale is null and void being in violation
of the provision of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and Rules 8 and 9
of the Rules, 2002. The sale effected in favour of the appellants on 18th
December, 2006 is liable to be set aside.   [paras 11, 13 to 18]

Mathew Varghese vs. M.Amritha Kumar & Ors. 2014 (2) Scale 331 - relied on.

2.  The borrowers -Respondent No.1 and 2 had evaluated the property at
Rs.117 lakhs which was acknowledged in their letter dated 28th August,
2006.  Therefore, the reserve price was fixed based upon the said figures.
The appellants bought the property for more than the reserve price.  The
appellants paid the entire consideration within three days of the sale,
i.e., on 15th December, 2006.  The Sale Deed was executed in their favour
on 20th December, 2006.  Possession was admittedly delivered on 20th
December, 2006 also.  The appellants have also incurred substantial loss as
they have been unnecessarily dragged into litigation. [Para 21]

3.  The single judge of the High Court after holding that the sale in
question was invalid, directed making of payments by respondent Nos. 1 and
2 to respondent No.3 bank with clear direction that on such payment,
insofar as the bank is concerned its dues shall stand settled.    Not only
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 made the payment as directed which was accepted by
respondent No.3 bank, insofar as respondent No.3 bank is concerned it even
accepted the said judgment and did not file any appeal thereagainst.  Only
the appellant filed the appeal.  Though the order of the Single Judge about
the validity of the sale had been affirmed, the Division Bench interfered
with the other direction of the Single Judge which should not have been
done as bank had not challenged the order of the Single Judge.  In the
facts of this case, once the payment is made to the appellant by respondent
Nos.1 and 2, the possession of the property shall be delivered to the
respondent Nos.1 and 2 with no further liability towards the bank.   [para
27]

4.    The sale in favour of the appellants and the subsequent delivery of
possession to the appellants is null and void.  The sale is accordingly set
aside. The appellants are directed to deliver the possession of the
property purchased by them under the Sale Deed dated to Respondent Nos. 1
and 2 immediately upon receiving the entire amount; Respondent No.3
directed to refund the entire proceeds of the FDR in which the sale
consideration was deposited together with accrued interest forthwith.
Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 will ensure that the entire amount due to the
appellants is paid on or before 15th June, 2014.  Upon receipt of the
entire amount, the possession shall be delivered to Respondent Nos. 1 and
2.  [Para 28]


United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 110: 2010 (9)
SCR 1 - referred to.


CASE LAW REFERENCE

2010 (9)  SCR 1 referred to. Para 4
2014 (2) Scale 331 relied on Para 12
REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3865  OF 2014
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.24915 of 2011)




      J.Rajiv Subramaniyan & Anr.                      …Appellants


      VERSUS
      M/s. Pandiyas & Ors.                         ...Respondents
                                 WITH
                CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3866  OF 2014
               (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.25448 of 2012)


                               J U D G M E N T


      SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR,J.
      1.  Leave granted.
      2. These special  leave  petitions  are  directed  against  the  final
      judgment and order dated 14th June, 2011 passed  by  the  Madras  High
      Court (Madurai Bench) in W.A.No.417 of 2011 dismissing  the  aforesaid
      Writ Appeal filed by the appellants.
      3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length.
      4.   Mr. Ashok Desai learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
      appellants has submitted that although many issues have been raised in
      the SLP, he is not pressing the point that the  High  Court  erred  in
      entertaining the writ petition filed by respondent Nos.1  and  2.  The
      point with regard to the maintainability  of  the  writ  petition  was
      taken on the basis of a judgment of this Court in the case  of  United
      Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors.[1]. It was urged before  the
      High Court that an alternative remedy being  available  to  respondent
      Nos.1 and 2 under the Securitization and Reconstruction  of  Financial
      Assets and Enforcement of Security  Interest  Act,  2002  (hereinafter
      referred to as “SARFAESI Act, 2002), the writ petition  would  not  be
      maintainable. The second issue with regard to the maintainability  was
      based on the fact that earlier respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had filed  Writ
      Petition Nos.5027-28 of 2006 challenging the auction sale notice dated
      23rd May, 2006. However, these writ petitions were  withdrawn  on  3rd
      July, 2006. The High Court did not give any liberty to respondent Nos.
      1 and 2 to file fresh writ petition. Mr. Desai very  fairly  submitted
      that it is not necessary to examine the issues on  maintainability  of
      the writ petition, as the entire issue is before this Court on merits.




      5.     Mr. Ashok Desai has pointed out that respondent Nos.1 and 2 had
      taken  various  loans  from  respondent  No.3-Bank.  Upon  failure  of
      Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to repay the loan, the  assets  of  respondent
      Nos.1 and 2 which had been mortgaged with  respondent  No.3-Bank  were
      classified as non-performing assets  (NPA).  Inspite  of  such  action
      having been taken by respondent  No.3-Bank,  respondent  Nos.1  and  2
      failed to regularize the bank account. Therefore, on 8th  June,  2005,
      the bank-respondent No.3 issued notice  under  Section  13(2)  of  the
      SARFAESI Act, 2002 followed by a possession notice  on  12th  January,
      2006 under Section 13(4) of the  said  Act.  Respondent  Nos.1  and  2
      challenged the aforesaid two notices  by  filing  Writ  Petition  Nos.
      4174/2006,  4175/2006,  5027/2006  and  5028/2006.  In  the  meantime,
      auction sale was fixed on 7th July, 2006. But no sale  took  place  as
      there were no bidders. On           28th August, 2006, respondent Nos.
      1  and  2  sought  cancellation  of  the  auction  notice  and  sought
      permission of respondent No.3-Bank  to  sell  the  secured  assets  by
      private Treaty. It was stated that as on  that  date  the  outstanding
      balance due to the bank was a sum of Rs.1.57  crores.  A  request  was
      made to break up the aforesaid amount as follows :
      (a) Machineries of M/s. Suruthi Fabrics            -  0.40 lacs
      (b) Land and building of M/s. Suruthi Fabrics  -  0.70 lacs
      (c) Pandias Garment Factory land and Building -  0.47 lacs
          And Suruthi Fabrics 5.51 acres Land


      6.     Permission was sought to sell the assets as stated above within
      six months. On 11th September, 2006, respondent Nos.1  and  2  made  a
      payment of Rs.42 lacs to respondent No.3-Bank,  by  selling  machinery
      with the permission of respondent No.3-Bank. A request was  also  made
      for an extension of two moths for paying the  remaining  amount  after
      selling the secured assets. On     8th December, 2006, respondent No.3-
      Bank gave approval for private sale of the immovable property  to  the
      appellants and for issue of sale certificate. On the very  same  date,
      the secured assets were  sold  in  favour  of  the  petitioner  for  a
      consideration of 123.10 lacs. It is not disputed by Mr.  Vikas  Singh,
      learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent No.3,  that  the  sale
      was affected through Ge-Winn Management  Company,  Resolution  Agents.
      This is also evident from the proceedings of the meeting held  between
      respondent No.3-Bank and        Ge-Winn on 8th December, 2006.


      7.     We may point out here that the reserve  price  of  the  secured
      assets was fixed at 123 lacs. Sale deed was executed in favour of  the
      appellants by respondent No.3 on 20th December, 2006,  as  the  entire
      considerations  have  been  paid  on  15th  December,  2006.  On  21st
      December, 2006, respondent Nos.1 and 2  were  informed  by  respondent
      No.3-Bank that the secured assets had been  sold  for  more  than  the
      amount offered by them in the letter dated 28th August, 2006. At  that
      stage, respondent Nos.1 and 2  filed  Writ  Petition  No.325  of  2007
      without disclosing that the  earlier  Writ  Petition  Nos.5027-28/2006
      challenging the auction notice dated              23rd May,  2006  had
      been withdrawn without the court giving liberty to respondent  Nos.  1
      and 2 to file a fresh writ petition.


      8.    Upon completion of the proceedings inspite  of  the  preliminary
      objections taken by the appellants, the learned Single  Judge  allowed
      the writ petitions. The sale in favour of the petitioner was  held  to
      be vitiated on the ground that respondent No.3-Bank failed  to  follow
      the mandatory provisions of Rules 8(5), 8(6) and 9(2) of the  Security
      Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules,
      2002’). But a direction was issued to refund the amount  paid  by  the
      petitioner i.e. Rs.1crore 41 lacs with interest at 9% per  annum  from
      April, 2007.


      9.    Aggrieved by the aforesaid  order,  the  appellants  filed  Writ
      Appeal No.4127/2011 in the High Court, which has also been dismissed.


      10. Mr. Ashok Desai  submits  that  the  petitioner  is  a  bona  fide
      purchaser and has paid the full consideration. Sale deed has been duly
      executed. Possession of the property  is  with  the  appellants  since
      2006. Therefore, respondent Nos.1 and 2 should  not  be  permitted  at
      this stage to claim that the sale is vitiated on the  ground  that  it
      has been affected through an agent of respondent No.3-Bank, namely, Ge-
      Winn. Mr. Desai submitted  that  the  Single  Judge  as  well  as  the
      Division Bench have wrongly held that  there  has  been  violation  of
      Rules 8(5), 8(6), 8(8) and 9(2) of the Rules, 2002. Mr. Desai  further
      submitted that it would be equitable to permit the petitioner to  keep
      the plot  which  is  adjacent  to  the  property  of  the  petitioner.
      Respondent Nos.1 and 2 can be permitted to take the other plots.


      11. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
      respondent Nos. 1 and 2 relying on  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in
      Mathew Varghese Vs. M.Amritha Kumar & Ors. in C.A.No.1927-1929 of 2014
      decided on 10th February,  2014  submits  that  the  Rules,  2002  are
      mandatory in nature. In the present case, the sale has  been  effected
      in violation of the aforesaid rules. Both the learned Single Judge  as
      well as the Division Bench  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the
      provisions of the aforesaid rules have not been followed.  It  is  not
      disputed by any of the parties that  there  is  no  agreement  between
      respondent Nos. 1 and 2  and  respondent  No.3-Bank,  in  writing,  to
      affect the sale by Private  Treaty.        Mr.  Vikas  Singh,  learned
      senior counsel appearing for respondent  No.3-Bank,  however,  pointed
      out that the respondent Nos.1 and 2 had filed  a  review  petition  in
      which it was averred that they may be permitted to  sell  the  secured
      assets by Private Treaty. Therefore, according  to  Mr.  Vikas  Singh,
      respondent Nos. 1 and 2 cannot now be heard to say that they  had  not
      given their consent to affect the  sale  by  Private  Treaty.  We  are
      unable to accept the submission made by Mr. Vikas Singh that there  is
      no violation of the Rules, 2002. In our opinion, the findings recorded
      by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the  High
      Court that there has been a violation of  Rules,  2002  are  perfectly
      justified.


      12. This Court in the case of Mathew Varghese Vs.  M.Amritha  Kumar  &
      Ors.[2] examined the procedure required to be followed by the banks or
      other financial institutions when the secured assets of the  borrowers
      are  sought  to  be  sold  for  settlement  of   the   dues   of   the
      banks/financial  institutions.   The  Court  examined  in  detail  the
      provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.  The  Court  also  examined  the
      detailed procedure to be followed by the  bank/financial  institutions
      under the Rules, 2002.  This  Court  took  notice  of  Rule  8,  which
      relates to Sale of immovable secured assets and Rule 9  which  relates
      to time of sale, issue of sale certificate and delivery of  possession
      etc.  With regard to Section 13(1), this Court observed  that  Section
      13(1) of SARFAESI Act, 2002 gives a free hand to the secured creditor,
      for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the  secured  interest  without  the
      intervention of Court or Tribunal.  But  such  enforcement  should  be
      strictly in conformity with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act,  2002.
      Thereafter, it is observed as follows:-
           “A reading of Section13(1), therefore, is clear  to  the  effect
           that while on the one hand any SECURED CREDITOR may be  entitled
           to enforce the SECURED ASSET created in its favour  on  its  own
           without resorting to any court proceedings  or  approaching  the
           Tribunal, such enforcement should  be  in  conformity  with  the
           other provisions of the SARFAESI Act.”


      13.   This Court further observed  that  the  provision  contained  in
      Section 13(8) of the  SARFAESI  Act,  2002  is  specifically  for  the
      protection of the borrowers in as much as, ownership  of  the  secured
      assets is a constitutional right vested in the borrowers and protected
      under Article 300A of  the  Constitution  of  India.   Therefore,  the
      secured creditor as a trustee of the secured asset can not  deal  with
      the same in any manner it likes and such an asset can be  disposed  of
      only in the manner prescribed in the SARFAESI Act,  2002.   Therefore,
      the creditor should ensure that the borrower was clearly put on notice
      of the date and time by which either the  sale  or  transfer  will  be
      effected in order to provide the required opportunity to the  borrower
      to take all possible steps for retrieving his property.  Such a notice
      is also necessary to ensure that the process of sale will ensure  that
      the secured assets will be sold to  provide  maximum  benefit  to  the
      borrowers.  The notice is also necessary to ensure  that  the  secured
      creditor or any one on its  behalf  is  not  allowed  to  exploit  the
      situation by virtue of proceedings initiated under the  SARFAESI  Act,
      2002.  Thereafter, in Paragraph 27, this Court observed as follows:-


           “27. Therefore, by virtue of the  stipulations  contained  under
           the   provisions   of   the   SARFAESI   Act,   in   particular,
           Section 13(8), any sale or transfer of a SECURED  ASSET,  cannot
           take place without duly informing the borrower of the  time  and
           date of such sale or transfer in order to enable the borrower to
           tender the dues of the SECURED CREDITOR with all costs,  charges
           and expenses and any such  sale  or  transfer  effected  without
           complying  with  the  said  statutory  requirement  would  be  a
           constitutional violation and nullify the ultimate sale.”


      14. As noticed above, this Court also examined Rules 8 and  9  of  the
      Rules, 2002.  On a detailed analysis of  Rules 8 and 9(1), it has been
      held that any sale effected without complying with the same  would  be
      unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
      15. In the present case, there is an additional reason  for  declaring
      that sale in favour of the appellant was a nullity.  Rule 8(8) of  the
      aforesaid Rules is as under:-
           “Sale by any method other than public auction or public  tender,
           shall be on such terms as may be settled between the parties  in
           writing.”




      16. It is not disputed before us that there were no terms  settled  in
      writing between the parties that the sale can be affected  by  Private
      Treaty.  In fact, the borrowers – respondent Nos. 1  and  2  were  not
      even called to the joint meeting between the Bank  –  Respondent  No.3
      and         Ge-Winn held on 8th December, 2006.  Therefore, there  was
      a clear violation of the aforesaid Rules rendering the sale illegal.


      17. It  must  be  emphasized  that  generally  proceedings  under  the
      SARFAESI Act, 2002 against the borrowers are initiated only  when  the
      borrower is in dire-straits.  The provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002
      and the Rules, 2002 have been enacted to ensure that the secured asset
      is not sold for a song.   It  is  expected  that  all  the  banks  and
      financial institutions which resort to the extreme measures under  the
      SARFAESI Act, 2002 for sale of the secured assets to ensure, that such
      sale of the asset provides maximum benefit to the borrower by the sale
      of such asset. Therefore, the secured creditors are expected  to  take
      bonafide measures to ensure that there  is  maximum  yield  from  such
      secured assets for the borrowers.  In  the  present  case,  Mr.  Dhruv
      Mehta has pointed out that sale consideration is only Rs.10,000/- over
      the reserve price whereas the property was worth much more.  It is not
      necessary for us to go into this question as, in our opinion, the sale
      is null and void being in violation of the provision of Section 13  of
      the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules, 2002.


      18. We, therefore, have no hesitation in upholding  the  judgments  of
      the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High  Court  to
      the effect that the sale effected in favour of the appellants on  18th
      December, 2006 is liable to be set aside.


      19. This now brings us to moulding the relief in  the  peculiar  facts
      and circumstances of this case.


      20.  As noticed earlier, Mr. Ashok Desai had emphasized on  behalf  of
      the appellants that no blame at all can be attributed  to  them.   The
      bank had decided to sell the immovable properties  to  the  appellants
      for Rs.1,23,10,000/- against  the  reserve  price  of  Rs.1,23,00,000.
      This is evident from the joint meeting of the bank held  with  Ge-Winn
      on 10th December, 2006, wherein it is observed as follows:-
           “Referring to the above in the presence of  the  undersigned  it
           has been decided to effect the sale to  M/s.  Susee  Automobiles
           Pvt.  Ltd.,  Madurai  and  Smt.  Nirmala  Jeyablan,   W/o   Shri
           Jayabaaalan, No.4,  S.V.  Nagar,  S.S.  Colony,  Madurai  for  a
           consideration of Rs.123.10 lakhs (Rupees one crore twenty  three
           lakhs and ten  thousand  only)  against  the  reserve  price  of
           Rs.123.00 lakhs and  issue  Sale  Certificate  for  registration
           under private treaty.”


      21. Mr. Desai had also pointed out that the borrowers -Respondent No.1
      and 2 had evaluated the property at Rs.117 lakhs.  The evaluation  was
      acknowledged  by  Respondent  Nos.  1  and  2  in  the  letter   dated
           28th August, 2006.  Therefore, the reserve price was fixed  based
      upon the aforesaid figures.  The appellants bought  the  property  for
      more  than  the  reserve  price.   The  appellants  paid  the   entire
      consideration within three days of the sale, i.e., on  15th  December,
      2006.  The Sale Deed was executed in their favour  on  20th  December,
      2006.   Possession  was  admittedly  delivered   on               20th
      December, 2006 also.  The appellants have  also  incurred  substantial
      loss as they have been  unnecessarily  dragged  into  litigation.   He
      pointed out that the  appellants  have  in  fact  incurred  losses  of
      Rs.3 crores as they were deprived of using the property in view of the
      interim orders passed by the High Court and they were forced  to  take
      other property on monthly rent of Rs.3 lakhs from  January  2007.  He,
      therefore, submitted that the proposal  made  by  the  appellants  for
      being permitted to keep the plot  adjacent  to  the  property  already
      owned by them,  be  accepted.   In  the  alternative,  learned  senior
      counsel submitted that the High Court has  unnecessarily  reduced  the
      amount of interest on the amount deposited by the appellants with  the
      bank would bear only 4% interest.  He submitted  that  the  appellants
      are entitled to 18% compound interest since the date  the  amount  was
      deposited till refund.


      22.    On the other hand, Mr. Dhruv Mehta pointed out that property of
      Respondent No.1 has been sold for a ridiculously  low  price,  as  the
      bank is interested only in regularizing the account of  the  borrower.
      He has submitted  that  respondent  Nos.  1  and  2  are  prepared  to
      compensate the appellants, to a reasonable  extent,  but  not  to  the
      extent claimed by Mr. Desai.


      23.     On the other hand, Mr. Vikas Singh has submitted that in  case
      the sale is to be set aside and the properties have to be returned  to
      the borrowers, the dues of the bank also have to be secured, which are
      now in the region of Rs.4 crores.


      24. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for
      the parties.


      25.  Initially  on  our  suggestion,  respondent  Nos.  1  and  2  had
      quantified the amount in accordance with the directions issued by  the
      learned Single Judge.  The learned Single Judge had ordered refund  of
      Rs.1,41,00,000/-, (Representing Rs.1,23,10,000/-  towards  Sale  Price
      and Rs.18,90,000/- towards Stamp Duty with interest @9% per annum from
      April 2007).  However, since we had accepted  the  second  alternative
      (partially) of Mr. Ashok Desai, the appellants  and  respondents  have
      jointly submitted the following chart:-
|Amount quantified by the    |Interest@ 18%    |Total             |
|Learned Single Judge        |from April 2007  |                  |
|                            |to 15.06.2014    |                  |
|Rs. 1,41,00,000/-           |Rs. 1,84,00,500/-|Rs. 3,25,00,500/- |
|Rs. 1,23,10,000/- Sale Price|                 |                  |
|Rs. 18,90,000/- (Stamp Duty)|                 |                  |


      26.  Mr. Dhruv Mehta has stated that  Respondent  Nos.  1  and  2  are
      prepared to refund the sale amount paid  by  the  appellants  as  Sale
      Price together with 18% simple interest from 1st July, 2007 till  15th
      June, 2014. The total  amount  spent  on  Stamp  Duty  shall  also  be
      refunded to the appellants. The total amount  shall  be  paid  to  the
      appellants by 15th June, 2014.  Mr. Desai had  pointed  out  that  the
      amount deposited with the bank, which is said to be  lying  in  a  FDR
      Bearing 8.25% per annum ought to  be  refunded  by  the  bank  to  the
      appellants.  Upon the entire amount being repaid  to  the  appellants,
      the possession of the property purchased by  the  appellants  will  be
      delivered to the Respondent Nos.1   and  2.
      27.   Insofar as the submission of  Mr.  Vikas  Singh  learned  senior
      counsel  is concerned we are unable to accept the same  in  the  facts
      and circumstances of this case  It would be relevant to point out that
      the learned Single Judge of the High Court after holding that the sale
      in question was invalid, directed making  of  payments  by  respondent
      Nos. 1 and 2 to respondent No.3 bank with clear direction that on such
      payment, insofar as  the  bank  is  concerned  its  dues  shall  stand
      settled.    Not only respondent Nos. 1  and  2  made  the  payment  as
      directed which was  accepted  by  respondent  No.3  bank,  insofar  as
      respondent No.3 bank is concerned it even accepted the  said  judgment
      and did not file any appeal thereagainst.  Only  the  appellant  filed
      the appeal.  Though the order of the learned Single  Judge  about  the
      validity of the sale had been affirmed, the Division Bench  interfered
      with the other direction of the learned Single Judge which should  not
      have been done as bank had not challenged the  order  of  the  learned
      Single Judge.  We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the facts  of
      this case, once the payment is made to  the  appellant  by  respondent
      Nos.1 and 2 in the manner stated hereinafter, the  possession  of  the
      property shall be delivered to the respondent  Nos.1  and  2  with  no
      further liability towards the bank
      28.    In view of the aforesaid, we hold that the sale  in  favour  of
      the appellants dated 18th December, 2006 and the  subsequent  delivery
      of possession to the  appellants  is  null  and  void.   The  sale  is
      accordingly set aside. The appellants  are  directed  to  deliver  the
      possession of the property purchased by them under the Sale Deed dated
      20th December, 2006 to  Respondent  Nos.  1  and  2  immediately  upon
      receiving the entire amount as directed hereunder:-
      (i)   The State Bank of India – Respondent No.3 directed to refund the
           entire proceeds of the FDR in which the sale  consideration  was
           deposited together with accrued interest forthwith.
      (ii)  The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 will ensure that the  entire  amount
           due to the appellants is paid on or before 15th June, 2014.
      (iii) Upon receipt of the  entire  amount,  the  possession  shall  be
           delivered to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
      29. With these observations, the appeals are disposed of with no order
      as to costs.


                                                             ….………………………..J.
                                                     [Surinder Singh Nijjar]






                                                              …………………………..J.
                                                                 [A.K.Sikri]
      New Delhi;
      March 14, 2014.




























                                                     -----------------------
[1]    [2010 (8) SCC 110]
[2]    2014 (2) Scale 331

-----------------------
19


SC allowed lenders to publish names & photographs of wilful defaulters - SBI vs. DJ Exim

 “In a move that may discourage firms from defaulting on bank loans, the Supreme Court has allowed lenders to publish names and photographs of wilful defaulters in newspapers in the larger public interest. The apex court said that the decision to resort to this measure would be taken by officers of the rank of general managers and above.
By giving the ruling on the matter, a bench headed by justice Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla upheld the Bombay High Court’s November 2013 order that allowed State Bank of India (SBI) to publish names and photographs of directors and guarantors of Mumbai-based defaulter firm DJ Exim (India) in newspapers on the grounds that Rule 8 framed under the Securitisation Act specifically authorised the banks to publish the names and addresses of wilful defaulters and there is also no legal bar that prohibits them from publishing such information. The SC accepted the bank’s stand that the move does not violate the defaulter’s right to privacy as the same is not absolute. From the bank’s point of view, the duty to maintain secrecy is superseded by a larger public interest as well as by the bank’s own interest under certain circumstances, it held.”
Submitted for your kind information , please.
Source: The Financial Express , July 17, 2014. (Full Text of the judgment yet to receive)

Saturday, May 31, 2014

THE DEBTS RECOVERY APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (PROCEDURE) RULES,1994

In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) and (2) of section 36 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), the Central Government hereby makes the following rules, namely:-
Short title and commencement
(1) These rules may be called THE DEBTS RECOVERY APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (PROCEDURE) RULES,1994.
(2) They shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette.
Definitions – In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires, -
(a)  “Act”  means the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993);
(b)  “agent” means a person duly authorised by a party to present appeal or to give reply on its behalf before the Appellate Tribunal;
(c)  “appeal” means an appeal made to the Appellate Tribunal under section 20 or section 30 of the Act;
(d)  “appellant” means a person or a bank or a financial institution making an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under section 20 or section 30 of the Act;
(e)  “Appellate Tribunal” means an Appellate Tribunal established by Central Government under section 8 of the Act;
(f)    “legal practitioner” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in the Advocates Act, 1961(25 of 1961)
(g)  “Presiding Officer” means the Presiding Officer of an Appellate Tribunal;
(h)  “Registrar” means the Registrar of an Appellate Tribunal and includes an officer of such Appellate Tribunal who is authorised by the Presiding Officer to function as Registrar;
(i)     “Registry” means the Registry of the Appellate Tribunal.
Sittings of Appellate Tribunal– An Appellate Tribunal shall hold its sittings either at Headquarters or at such other place falling within its jurisdiction as it may consider convenient.
Language of Appellate Tribunal
(1)The proceedings of the Appellate Tribunal shall be conducted in English or Hindi.
(2) No appeal, reference, application, representation, document or other matters continued in any language other than English or Hindi, shall be accepted by the Appellate Tribunal, unless the same is accompanied by a true copy of translation thereof in English or Hindi.
Procedure for filing appeals
(1) A memorandum of appeal shall be presented in the Form annexed to these rules by the Appellant either in person to the Registrar of the Appellate Tribunal within whose jurisdiction his case falls or shall be sent by registered post addressed to such Registrar.
(2) Where the appellant is a bank or a financial institution, a memorandum of appeal may be preferred, -
(a)          by one or more legal practitioners authorised by such bank or financial institution or,
(b)          by any of the officers of such bank or financial institution to act as Presenting Officers;
and every person so authorised may present the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.
(3) Where the appellant is other than a bank or a financial institution, he may prefer an appeal in person or by his agent or by a duly authorised legal practitioner.
(4) An appeal sent by post under sub-rule (1) shall be deemed to have been presented to the Registrar on the day on which it is received in the office of the Registrar.
(5) The appeal under sub-rule (1) shall be presented in four sets in a paper book along with an empty file size envelope bearing full address of the respondent and where the number of respondents are more than one, then sufficient number of extra paper books together with empty file size envelopes bearing full addresses of each respondent shall be furnished by the appellant.
Presentation and scrutiny of memorandum of appeal
(1) The Registrar shall endorse on every appeal the date on which it is presented under rule 5 or deemed to have been presented under that rule and shall sign endorsement.
(2) If, on scrutiny, the appeal is found to be in order, it shall be duly registered and given a serial number.        
(3) If an appeal on scrutiny is found to be defective and the defect noticed is formal in nature, the Registrar may allow the appellant to rectify the same in his presence and if the said defect is not formal in nature, the Registrar, may allow the appellant such time to rectify the defect as he may deem fit.   
(4) If the concerned appellant fails to rectify the defect within the time allowed in sub-rule (3), the Registrar may by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, decline to register such memorandum of appeal.         
(5) An appeal against the order of the Registrar under sub-rule (4) shall be made within fifteen days of making of such order to the Presiding Officer concerned in his chamber, whose decision thereon shall be final.
Place of filing memorandum of appeal – The memorandum of appeal shall be filed by the appellant with the Registrar of the Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter.
Fee
(1) Every memorandum of appeal under section 20 of the Act shall be accompanied with a fee provided in sub-rule (2) and such fee may be remitted either in the form of crossed demand draft drawn on a nationalised bank in favour of the Registrar and payable at the station where the Registrar’s office is situated or remitted through a crossed Indian Postal Order drawn in favour of the Registrar and payable in Central Post Office of the station where the Appellate Tribunal is located.
(2) The amount of fee payable in respect of appeal under section 20 shall be as follows:-
Amount of debt dueAmount of fees payable
Less than rupees 10 lakhs             Rupees 12,000
Rupees 10 lakhs or more but  Less than rupees 30 lakhs Rupees 20,000
Rupees 30 lakhs or more Rupees 30,000
Deposit of amount of debt due–Where an appeal is preferred by a person referred to in section 21 of the Act, such appeal shall not be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal unless such person has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal seventy-five per cent of the amount of debt so due from him as determined by the Tribunal under section 19 of the Act, provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under section 21 of the Act.
Contents of memorandum of appeal
(1)Every memorandum of appeal filed under Rule 5 shall set forth concisely under distinct heads, the grounds of such appeal without any argument or narrative, and such grounds shall be numbered consecutively and shall be typed in double line space on one side of the paper.
(2) It shall not be necessary to present separate memorandum of appeal to seek interim order or direction if in the memorandum of appeal, the same is prayed for.
Documents to accompany memorandum of appeal
Every memorandum of appeal shall be in triplicate and shall be accompanied with two copies (at least one of which shall be certified copy) of the order of the Presiding Officer of Debts Recovery Tribunal or order made by the Recovery Officer under section 30 of the Act, as the case may be, against which the appeal is filed.
(2) Where the parties to the appeal are being represented by an agent, documents authorising him to act as such agent shall also be appended to the appeal. Provided that where an appeal is filed by a legal practitioner, it shall be accompanied by a duly executed Vakalatnama.
(3) Where a bank or financial institution is being represented by any of its Officers to act as Presenting Officer before the Appellate Tribunal, the document authorising him to act as Presenting Officer shall be appended to the memorandum of appeal.
Plural remedies – A memorandum of appeal shall not seek relief or reliefs based on more than a single cause of action in one single memorandum of appeal unless the reliefs prayed for are consequential to one another.
Endorsing copy of appeal to the respondents – A copy of the memorandum of appeal and paper book shall be served on each of the respondents, as soon as they are filed, by the Registrar by registered post.
Filing of reply to the appeal and other documents by the respondent
(1) The respondent may file four complete sets containing the reply to the appeal alongwith documents in a paper book form with the registry within one month of the service of the notice on him of the filing of the memorandum of appeal.
(2) The respondent shall also endorse one copy of the reply to the appeal alongwith documents as mentioned in sub-rule(1) to the appellant.
(3) The Appellate Tribunal may, in its discretion on application by the respondent, allow the filing of reply referred to in sub-rule (1), after the expiry of the period referred to therein.
Who may be joined as respondents
(1) In an appeal by a person other than bank or financial institution, the bank or financial institution who has to recover any debt from any person under section 19 of the Act, before the Tribunal against whose order the appeal has been preferred, shall be made the respondent to the appeal.
(2) In an appeal by the bank or a financial institution the other party shall be made the respondent to the appeal.
Date and place of hearing to be notified. – The Appellate Tribunal shall notify the parties the date and place of hearing of the appeal in such a manner as the Presiding Officer may by general or special order direct.
Dress Regulations for the Presiding Officer and for the Representative of the Parties
(1) Summer dress for the Presiding Officer shall be white pant with black coat and a black tie or a buttoned-up black coat. In winter, striped or black trousers may be worn in place of white trousers. In the case of female Presiding Officers, however, the dress shall be black coat over white saree.
(2) The dress for the agent of the parties (other than a relative or regular employee of the appellant or respondent) appearing before the Appellate Tribunal shall be the following, namely:-
(a)      In the case of a male, a suit with a tie or buttoned-up coat over a pant or national dress, that is, a long buttoned-up coat on dhoti or churidar pyjama. The colour of the coat shall, preferably, be black.
(b)      In the case of female, black coat over white or any other sober coloured saree.
(c)      Where, however, the agent belongs to a profession like that of lawyers or a chartered accountants and they have been prescribed a dress for appearing in their professional capacity before any Court, Appellate Tribunal, tribunal or other such authority, they may, at their option, appear in that dress, in lieu of the dress mentioned above.
(3)  All other persons appearing before the Appellate Tribunal shall be properly dressed.
Order to be signed and dated
(1) Every order of the Appellate Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed and dated by the Presiding Officer of the Appellate Tribunal.
(2)     The order shall be pronounced in open Court.
Publication of orders. – The orders of the Appellate Tribunal as are deemed fit for publication in any authoritative report or the press may be released for such publication on such terms and conditions as the Appellate Tribunal may lay down.
Communication of orders.-  Every order passed on an appeal shall be communicated to the appellant and to the respondent and to the Tribunal concerned either in person or by registered post free of cost.
Fee for inspection of records and obtaining copies thereof
(1) A fee of rupees twenty for every hour or part thereof of inspection subject to a minimum of rupees one hundred shall be charged for inspecting the records of a pending appeal by a party thereto.
(2)      A fee of rupees five for a folio or part thereof not involving typing and a fee of rupees ten for a folio or part thereof involving typing of statement and figures shall be charged.
Orders and directions in certain cases. –The Appellate Tribunal may make such orders or give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice.
Working hours of the Appellate Tribunal
(1) Except on Saturdays, Sundays and other public holidays, the offices of the Appellate Tribunal shall, subject to any other order made by the Presiding Officer, re_self open daily from 10 a.m to 6.00 p.m. but no work, unless of an urgent nature, shall be admitted after 4.30 p.m. on any working day.
(2) The sitting hours of the Appellate Tribunal shall ordinarily be from 10.30 a.m. to 1.00 p.m. and 2.00 p.m. to 5.00p.m. subject to any order made by the Presiding Officer.
Holiday. – Where the last day for doing any act falls on a day on which the office of the Appellate Tribunal is closed and by reason thereof the act cannot be done on that day, it may be done on the next day on which that office opens.
Powers and functions of the Registrar
(1) The Registrar shall have the custody of the records of the Appellate Tribunal and shall exercise such other functions as are assigned to him under these rules or by the Presiding Officer by a separate order in writing.
(2) The official seal shall be kept in the custody of the Registrar.
(3)      Subject to any general or special direction by the Presiding Officer, the seal of the Appellate Tribunal shall not be affixed to any order, summons or other process, save under the authority in writing from the Registrar.
(4)      The seal of the Appellate Tribunal shall not be affixed to any certified copy issued by the Tribunal save under the authority in writing of the Registrar.
Additional powers and duties of Registrar. – In addition to the powers conferred elsewhere in these rules, the Registrar shall have the following powers and duties subject to any general or special orders of the Presiding Officer, namely:- 
(1)              To receive all appeals and other documents;
(2)              To decide all questions arising out of the scrutiny of the appeals before they are registered;
(3)              To require any appeal presented to the Appellate Tribunal to be amended in accordance with the rules;
(4)              Subject to the directions of the Presiding Officer to fix date of hearing of the appeals or other proceedings and issue notices thereof;
(5)              Direct any formal amendment of records;
(6)              To order grant of copies of documents to parties to proceedings;
(7)              To grant leave to inspect the record of Appellate Tribunal.
(8)              Dispose of all matters relating to the service of notices or other processes, application for the issue of fresh notice or for extending the time for or ordering a particular method of service on a respondent including a substituted service by publication of the notice by way of advertisements in the newspapers;
(9)              To requisition records from the custody of any Court or other authority.
Seal and emblem. –The Official seal and emblem of the Appellate Tribunal shall be such as the Central Government may specify.